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RECENT NATURAL RESOURCES CASE
Eminent Domain-Review of Route Selection Made
by Public Utility Through Private Wildlife Refuge*
A. DAN TARLOCKt
An interstate natural gas and pipe line company sought to con-
demn an easement of right of way across a portion of a private, non-
profit wildlife preserve. The preserve contested the route selection
alleging it would "have a devastating and irreparable effect on its
preserve," and that the company had refused to consider alternative
routes which "would greatly reduce or largely eliminate the appre-
hended damage."' The trial court, however, ruled that since the
preserve was not devoted to a public use, the route selection was
within the company's discretion.2 In Texas Eastern Transmission
Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc.,8 the Supreme Court of New Jersey
unanimously reversed, holding that the preserve had undertaken a
public function and that the route selection was arbitrarily made be-
cause the preserve was denied the opportunity to present evidence
on the availability of feasible alternative routes.
0 Texas E. Trans. Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc., 48 N.J. 261, 225 A.2d 130
(1966).
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky, Lexington.
1. Texas E. Trans. Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc., 48 N.J. 261 225 A.2d 130, 135
(1966). Experts testified that the preserve "is the finest inland, natural fresh water
wetland in the entire Northwestern United States . . . ." They objected to the route
chosen because it would eliminate the preserve's two best groves of trees thereby
effecting the nearby habitat in terms of shade, temperature, and windbreaks, and a
number of springs and streams might be substantially damaged which in turn might
permanently alter the ecology of the area. Specifically, the excavation required for the
pipeline would render the water permanently cloudy thereby blocking the light required
by aquatic plant organisms. This would disrupt the food supply of the animals which
feed on the organisms. Id. at 136-37.
2. Texas E. Trans. Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc., 89 N.J. Super 1, 213 A.2d 193
(Law Div. 1965). The court held the land was not devoted to a public use because the
preserve had voluntarily undertaken the preservation of wildlife rather than being
legally obligated to do so.
3. 48 N.J. 261, 225 A.2d 130 (1966).
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Texas Eastern represents a new approach to judicial review of the
merits of route or site selections made pursuant to a valid exercise of
eminent domain, for the court declined to apply two well established
doctrines. According to the first, the court will not review the de-
cision to select a parcel of privately owned land in the absence of
fraud, bad faith, or circumstances indicating arbitrary or capricious 4
action, which has been interpreted to mean that the court will inter-
vene only to curb clear cases of procedural abuse rather than to re-
view the merits of site or route selections. 5 According to the second
doctrine, if the property is currently being put to a public use, the
court may decide if the condemnor's use is a more necessary public
use,e but property devoted to a public use has been defined not to in-
clude land used in connection with a "mere voluntary assumption of
public service" for the public must have "an enforceable right to a
definite and fixed use to the property."'7 The court in Texas Eastern
created a new category of land which serves a public function but
does not meet the strict requirements of the traditional public use
definition and adapted the standard of arbitrariness to review the
merits of route and site selections, reasoning as follows:
In such unique cases courts realize that more than a dollar valuation
is involved. The public service being rendered must be considered
and it cannot be evaluated adequately only in dollars and cents. The
4. Williams v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 89 F. Supp. 485 (W.D.S.C.
1950) and Texas Pine Line Co. v. Stein, 190 So.2d 244 (La. Cir. Ct. App. 1966). See
generally Forer, Preservation of America's Park Lands: The Inadequacy of Present
Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1093, 1110-13 (1966).
5. United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230 (1946) (decision to condemn city park
for post office non-reviewable if made in good faith). See generally Tippy, Review of
Route Selections for the Federal Aid Highway Systems, 27 Mont. L. Rev. 131, 141
(1966).
6. In practice the courts generally decline to decide the comparative merits of the
competing public uses by treating the question as one of statutory construction deciding
only if the legislature gave the condemnor authority to condemn property being put to
an existing public use or exempted the property from condemnation. See, e.g., City of
Beaumont v. Beaumont Irrigation Dist., 63 Cal. App.2d 291, 46 Cal. Rptr. 465, 405 P.2d
377 (1965) ; Vermont Hydro-Electric Corp. v. Dunn, 95 Vt. 144, A. 223 2 ALR,
1495 (1921).
7. Texas E. Trans. Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc., 89 N.J. Super. 1, 213 A.2d 193,
195 Law Div. 1965. The court cited as authority I. Nichols on Eminent Domain §2.2 p.
146 which was apparently a reference to I. Nichols Eminent Domain § 2.2(5) (3d ed.
1964). The rule seems to have originated in a series of cases refusing to classify prop-
erty held by common carriers to be devoted to a public use because although the prop-
erty served the public they had no right to demand that the carrier continue to serve
them as they could go out of business at any time. See New York, L. & W. R. Co. v.
Union Steamboat Co., 99 N.Y. 12, 1 N.E. 27 (1885) and Diamond Jo Line Steamers v.
Davenport, 114 Iowa 432, 87 N.W. 399 (1901).
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difference is not in the principle but in its application; that is, the
quantum of proof required of this defendant to show arbitrariness
against it should not be as substantial as that to be assumed by the
ordinary property owner who devotes his land to conventional uses.8
The court correctly held that the pipe line company was empow-
ered under section 717 (f)h of the Natural Gas Act to condemn the
land' and that the preserve was not qualified under the standard def-
inition of land devoted to a public use to determine its exemption
from condemnation.' 0 The court held that because the use made of
the land would be a public use if it had been undertaken by the fed-
eral or state government the preserve had "a special and unique sta-
tus . . . lower than that of a public utility but higher than that of
an ordinary owner who puts his land to conventional use."" The
basis for this new classification was federal and state government
concern for wildlife conservation manifested by statutes authorizing
the expenditure of public monies for the acquisition and management
of preserves.' 2 Having classified the preserve as analogous to land
devoted to public use, the decision to review the merits of the route
selection was a logical extension of previous New Jersey cases and
the recent second circuit decision in Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conference v. Federal Power Commission.3
New Jersey has applied the traditional definition of arbitrariness
to review route or site selections of privately owned land 4 but has
8. 255 A.2d at 137. In remanding the case the court stated, "we express no
opinion on the merits of the controversy." Id. at 139. However, a consideration of the
merits is implicit in the court's decision that the values represented by the preserve are
entitled to greater consideration by the condemnor.
9. 61 Stat. 459 (1947), 15 U.S.C. §717 (f) h (1958). Tennessee Gas Transmission
Co. v. Thatcher, 84 F. Supp. 344 (W.D. La. 1949), aff'd 180 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1950),
cert. denied 340 U.S. 829 (1950). The statute imposes no duty on the condemnor to
minimize the damage done to the property by the right of way as do some statutes.
See e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. §65-4-8 (Repl. 1960). See generally Note, The Use of Eminent
Domain for Oil and Gas Pipelines in New Mexico, 4 Natural Resources J. 360 (1964).
10. This definition has been strictly applied in previous cases. See, e.g., Bailey v.
Anderson, 182 Va. 70, 27 S.E.2d 914 (1943) cert. denied 321 U.S. 799 (1943), which
held that grist mill was not devoted to a public use even though Virginia law required
owner to grind all grain brought by persons for their own or family use.
11. 225 A.2d at 134.
12. The court cited 50 Stat. 917 (1937), 16 U.S.C. 669 (1964) (federal wildlife
restoration program) ; 16 U.S.C. 671 et seq. (establishment of various wildlife refuges) ;
and N.J. Stat. Ann. § 23:12-1 (Supp. 1966) (assent to provisions of federal wildlife
restoration act).
13. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
14. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Hirschfield, 38 N.J. Super. 132, 118 A.2d
64 (App. Div. 1955) (pipeline right of way over privately owned land). There has,
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been much more willing than most courts to review the merits of a
condemnation decision when the land sought is devoted to a public
use even though the condemnor has express statutory authority to
condemn the property. In Weehawken Township v. Erie R.R. Co.",
the court refused to allow the township to condemn a portion of a
railroad yard for a recreation center without a showing that no al-
ternative sites were available because of the railroad's demonstrated
need for the site. Weehawken Township indicates that the New
Jersey courts have never defined arbitrariness solely in the terms of
procedural abuse but rather have attempted to assure that the con-
demnor has seriously explored methods of minimizing the disruptive
effects of his decision on existing public uses. The court, however,
relied most on Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal
Power Commission. The F.P.C. licensed a pump storage project on
the Hudson river near historic Storm Mountain. The issue as
framed by the Commission in considering the license was "[i]f on
this record Con Edison has available an alternative source for meet-
ing its power needs which is better adapted to the development of
the Hudson River for all beneficial uses, including scenic beauty, this
application should be denied.' u 6 Nonetheless, the Commission
granted the license. The second circuit set it aside and remanded the
case for further proceedings because the Commission had failed to
consider sufficiently the feasibility of alternative sources of power
which would not impair the scenic qualities of the area. The signif-
icance of Scenic Hudson is the court's redefinition of the manner in
which the F.P.C. must serve the public interest in its license proceed-
ings: "In this case, as in many others, the Commission has claimed
to be the representative of the public interest. This role does not
permit it to act as an umpire blandly calling balls and strikes for ad-
versaries appearing before it; the right of the public must receive
active and affirmative protection at the hands of the Commission.'1 7
however, been prior dissatisfaction on the New Jersey court with the limited scope of
review. In a four to two decision the court held that fraud, bad faith, or abuse of
discretion had not been shown when the city condemned a privately owned parking lot
to construct a parking garage to be leased to another private operator and granted
summary judgment for the city. The condemnee offered to prove that the city owned an
equally sizeable lot across the street which contained a school currently being used to
store text books. The two dissenting judges, which included Chief Justice Vanderbilt,
would have ordered a trial on the merits. City of Trenton v. Lenzner, 16 N.J. 465, 109
A.2d 409 (1954).
15. 20 N.J. 572, 120 A.2d 593 (1956).
16. 354 F.2d at 612.
17. Id. at 620.
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Thus, the court, in effect, placed an affirmative burden on the Com-
mission to protect the scenic beauty of an area when it is threatened
by an F.P.C. licensee and provided this burden could only be dis-
charged by seriously considering alternative development proposals
which would be less destructive of an area's scenic beauty.
Texas Eastern extends Scenic Hudson by applying it to decisions
initially made by private rather than governmental bodies and by
explicitly shifting the burden of proof to the condemnor to disprove
the feasibility of proposed alternatives. The condemnee, of course,
still has the ultimate burden of proving that the selection was arbi-
trarily made but under Texas Eastern, having introduced evidence
that the ecology or scenic beauty of an area would be seriously
damaged as the result of the route or site selection and that feasible
alternatives are available, the burden of going forward with the
evidence shifts to the condemnor. As a practical matter he must now
disprove the feasibility of the proposed alternatives. In the applica-
tion of Texas Eastern to future decisions two major issues are left
unanswered. What kinds of uses of land can be classified as analo-
gous to public use? To what extent can the condemnor discharge the
burden of proof by showing that the proposed alternative is more
costly than his original selection? The decision also raises more basic
questions about the propriety of judicial intervention in the route
and site selection process to accord greater protection to scenic
beauty and related values.
The court discounted the possibility that the duty to consider al-
ternatives imposed on the condemnor was unconstitutional as an
undue burden on interstate commerce stating that this was a different
case from denial of plaintiff's right to condemn a necessary portion
of the preserve which would be clearly unconstitutional."' The court
did not discuss Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Borough of
Milltown, 9 an earlier federal district court opinion from New Jer-
sey. A borough attempted to exclude a pipeline from a residential
section of the city by a zoning ordinance alleging that the pipeline
was unsafe and that alternative routes were available. The court
found that the safety claims were not substantiated by expert testi-
mony and refused to consider alternative routes reasoning, "The fact
remains that the mere claim by defendant that its ordinance requires
plaintiff to locate its pipeline in an alternative route ... does not
18. See New York State Natural Gas Corp. v. Town of Elma, 182 F. Supp. 1
(W.D.N.Y. 1960).
19. 93 F. Supp. 287 (D.N.J. 1950).
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fortify it with the power to impede plaintiff in the prosecution of its
legal objective in the field of interstate commerce. '2' However,
Transcontinental is distinguishable from Texas Eastern. The pre-
serve proved that actual damage would be caused by the route
chosen, while the borough could prove none, and the borough, unlike
the preserve, did not propose a specific alternative route. Further,
close factual analysis of the impact of the duty imposed in Texas
Eastern suggested by the Supreme Court in Arizona v. Southern
Pacific Co.2 and Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines22 should lead to the
conclusion that the requirements that "feasible" or "reasonable"
alternatives be considered does not conflict with the congressional
policy of the free flow of fuel from producing to consumer states.
The court based its classification on state and federal statutes
which demonstrate a clear public concern for the preservation of
wildlife. Prior statutory recognition that the condemnee's use serves
a public purpose could function as the standard for future de-
cisions. 23 It would relieve the courts of the necessity to make subjec-
tive ecological and aesthetic value judgments about a variety of land
uses. However, this standard would be rejected because it is too
narrow. It would eliminate judicial review of the merits of decisions
to condemn many parcels of land or other natural resources simply
because Congress or the state legislature has not yet decided the
values they represent are worthy of public protection and enhance-
ment.
A case in point is in the Napa Valley north of San Francisco
which has been described as a "unique resource, praised and treas-
ured not only for the wines and fruits produced in its vineyards and
orchards, but for its glorious settings and as the beautiful green re-
treat it represents for millions in the crowded Bay Area cities." 24
Suppose a utility proposes overhead powerlines through the heart
of a well-known vineyard because their engineers have decided it is
the most economically efficient route. A strong case can be made for
the need to preserve the vineyard both because of a shortage of
prime irrigable land in California and the need for open space and
20. Id. at 295.
21. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
22. 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
23. This has been proposed as the standard to determine the analogous question
of standing to sue to assert conservation values. See Note, Standing to Sue and Con-
servation Values, 38 Colo. L. Rev. 391, 405 (1966).
24. Bronson, A. Proposal: The Napa Valley National Vineyard, Cry California 14
(Summer 1966).
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recreation areas around urban concentrations. 25 A Napa Valley Na-
tional Vineyard has been proposed but neither Congress nor the
State of California has yet acted.26 Under a strict interpretation of
Texas Eastern a court could refuse to allow a condemnee to present
evidence on the availability of alternative routes.2
It should be realized that the court in Texas Eastern was not
merely protecting an isolated wildlife refuge but that it was protect-
ing the integrity of an "environmental corridor" adjacent to a
densely populated urban area.28 An "environmental corridor" is
formed by an area's major scenic resources and cultural amenities.
Specialists in environmental design and landscape architecture are
devising objective methods of identifying these resources and
amenities and when they are plotted on a map the "environmental
corridor" is delineated.29 Selected area studies indicated that ninety
percent of an area's cultural amenities are clustered in linear pat-
terns usually following a water course.30 Thus, the condemnor
should be allowed to introduce evidence of alternatives when his
land lies within such an "environmental corridor" and contains
scenic resources or cultural amenities. 3 ' This should give the court
flexible yet objective standards to protect the types of land uses
society is coming to realize should be maintained.
The court gave little indication of the cost differential which must
25. See Mumford, Townscape and Landscape, The Highway and the City (Har-
court, Brace, & World, Inc. 1963).
26. Bronson, supra note 24, at 14.
27. The court could find the necessary statutory policy in the California Land Con-
servation Act of 1965, Cal. Gov't. Code § 51200- 95, and the Breathing Space
Amendment to the state constitution, Cal. Const. art 28, § 2, which permit land to be
restricted for recreation, the enjoyment of scenic beauty, or the production of food and
fiber and to be assessed at its current restricted use. See Comment, Assessment of
Farmland Under California Land Conservation Act and the "Breathing Space"
Amendment, 55 Calif. L. Rev. 273 (1967).
28. The concept of an "environmental corridor" is taken from a presentation made
by Professor Philip H. Lewis, professor of Landscape Architecture at the University
of Wisconsin, at a conference on Scenic Easements in Action held at the University of
Wisconsin, December 16-17, 1966. A Manual for the Conference Workshops and the
Conference Proceedings have been published by the University of Wisconsin.
The value of preserving swamps near urban areas is discussed in Atkinson, Great
Swamp is Good For Nothing But Life, Knowledge, Peace, and Hope, N.Y. Times Feb.
12, 1967, F.2d (magazine), at 33.
29. Professor Lewis has inventoried cultural attractions under 260 headings, each
identified by a symbol. These include wildlife preserves, orchards and a general store.
Manual for the Conference Workshops. p. 4 (U. of Wis. 1966).
30. Id. at 2.
31. See Twiss and Litton, Rsource Use in the Regional Landscape, 6 Natural Re-
sources J. 76 (1966).
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be borne by the condemnor if the alternative route proves more
costly except to indicate that cost was one of the factors which
went into a determination of feasibility and to make it clear that
"within reasonable limits the fact that an alternative route will be
more expensive should not deter its selection by a utility, if the public
convenience and necessity are better served thereby. '8 2 The court
in Scenic Hudson put the matter directly in stating that future
F.P.C. licensing proceedings "must include as a basic concern the
preservation of natural beauty . . . keeping in mind that in our
affluent society, the cost of the project is only one of several factors
to be considered." 8
The question of how much of the cost of preserving ecologic and
scenic values can be shifted to the condemnor ultimately involves the
propriety of judicial intervention in decisions such as Texas Eastern.
To approach an answer it is necessary to examine the major assump-
tions which appear to underlie the court's reasoning. The first is
that there is a need to preserve a balance between man and his
natural environment. Several practical reasons for doing so have
been proposed such as the need to preserve a research laboratory
for the ecologist or the prevention of floods, but in many instances
the decision involves one's personal sense of aesthetics. 4 The court
seems to base its opinion on the fact that this need is shared by a
significant portion of the community and that existing natural re-
sources allocation decisions give little weight to preserving ecologic
and scenic values because they have little or no market price. The
second is that the increasing number of bodies possessing the power
of eminent domain and the consequent competition for land means
that condemnors must be made more responsive to the impact of
their decisions on the community than they have been in the past.
The third is that decisions such as those made in Scenic Hudson
and Texas Eastern are planning and allocation decisions in the
broadest sense of the term but the decision makers are not making
the inquiries planning theory suggests ought to be made.85 The fac-
tors considered are often phrased in objective terms such as the
32. 225 A.2d at 138.
33. 354 F.2d at 624.
34. Mr. Justice Douglas has attempted to analogize these ecologic and scenic
values to guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights. Douglas, A Wilderness Bill of
Rights (1965). For a criticism of his position see Tarlock, Book Review, 19 Stan. L.
Rev. 895 (1967).
35. For a full elaboration of this idea see Reich, The Law of the Planned Society,
75 Yale L.J. 1227 (1966).
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calculation of the cost-benefit ratio but this tends to obscure the
fact that these purported objective criteria mask a number of sub-
jective value judgments and policy considerations. 6 Specifically,
there are two inquiries which planners should make but which are
not generally made in any meaningful sense in many natural re-
sources allocation decisions. Professor Kevin Lynch has described
them as follows:
The objectives will be weighted toward those that affect the com-
munity as a whole, or large groups within the community, with
emphasis on groups that are normally less vocal in community de-
cisions. There will be a similar weighting toward longer periods of
time and unborn generations: the future will be discounted less than
by other advisers or decision-makers ...
Where possible, the scope of the goals will be expanded to be
more nearly inclusive of all the major relevant values and problems
of the community, in order to prevent sub-optimizing.87
The final assumption is that courts must begin to re-evaluate
their traditional reluctance to undertake substantive review of these
kinds of controversies in order to help reduce increasing inter-gov-
ernmental conflicts over the use of our natural resources to prevent
the waste of public monies." For example, the Bureau of Reclama-
tion has announced its intention to divert substantial amounts of
water for irrigation from the American River near Sacramento,
California, while other federal, state and local agencies are spend-
ing millions of dollars to develop the area as a river parkway.8 9
Administrative resolution of these conflicts seldom insures substan-
tial consideration of wildlife, ecological, or aesthetic values as most
natural resources agencies or public utilities view the problem from
a limited perspective as they are not structured to consider all po-
tential uses of a resource.
These assumptions suggest that the new approach to judicial re-
36. See Hammond, Convention and Limitation in Benefit-Cost Analysis, 6 Natural
Resources J. 195 (1966).
37. Lynch, Quality in City Design, Who Designs America? 120, 127-28 (Princeton
Press 1966).
38. For a case typical of judicial reluctance to intervene in these controversies see
State of Washington v. F.P.C., 207 F.2d 391 (9th. Cir. 1953) where the court con-
cluded in the face of allegations that the F.P.C.'s license conditions were inadequate to
preserve anadromous fish, "if the dams will destroy the fish . . . we are powerless to
prevent it." Id. at 398.
39. Wood and Lembke, The Federal Threats to the California Landscape, Cry
California 23 (Spring 1967).
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view represented by Scenic Hudson and Texas Eastern is sound and
ought to be continued. It is time to recognize that those who have the
power to accelerate the decline in environmental quality ought to
bear the costs of arresting that decline just as we have already
decided, for example, that a land developer who contributes to com-
munity problems such as increased traffic or a shortage of recreation
space ought to bear the costs of minimizing the burdens he has cast
on the community.40 Constitutional limitations such as the due
process and equal protection clauses can be used to prevent the
imposition of excessive costs on the condemnor.4 The role of the
judiciary in protecting environmental quality will be limited com-
pared to the power of the legislature but the courts can try to insure
that the decision making process comports with some idealized no-
tion of the planning process by broadening the range of values
which must be seriously considered in a condemnation decision, and
by attempting to minimize conflicts over the use of natural resources
by requiring the decisions be made only after alternative methods of
eliminating them have been thoroughly explored.42
A. DAN TARLOCKt
40. See generally Schiff, Outdoor Recreation Values in the Public Decision Process,
6 Natural Resources J. 542 (1966).
41. See Heyman and Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Com-
munity Costs on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Extractions, 73 Yale
L. J. 1119 (1964).
42. The location of public utility transmission lines has recently become a matter
of Congressional concern. Several bills have been introduced in Congress to require
greater public review of route selections which threaten an area's ecologic, historic,
and aesthetic values. See e.g., in the 90th Cong., 1st. Sess., S. 1843, 1835, 1934, and 2227
and H.R. 11809 and 12322.
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